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Global governance is simply the latest in a series of endeavors to create 
common values, a common loyalty, indeed a common home.  One World is the title of a 
book by Wendell Willkie, a failed presidential candidate back in the 1940s.  On 
Perpetual Peace is the title of an essay recommending global governance written more 
than two centuries ago by Immanuel Kant, the most influential modern philosopher.  
And, of course, everybody should be familiar with the phrase “Tower of Babel.”  The 
point here is that the utopian longing for peace, stability, and unity which stirs every 
heart is an age-old one.  Although it provides occasions for mischief, as do many NGOs 
[the subject of this panel discussion], our problem has more to do with the would-be 
architects of what Thomas Sowell calls the “quest for cosmic justice:” ideologues who 
seek the power to decide what is in the best interest of humanity.  They have an agenda 
and, as Kenneth Minogue puts it, they use despotic means to achieve it: that is, what he 
calls “political moralism.”  Roger Scruton calls this “the culture of repudiation.” 
When Alexis de Tocqueville traveled to America in the early 1830s to assess the 
effects of democracy under what seemed to be laboratory conditions, he was impressed 
with the individualism of the self-governing citizen and the array of voluntary benevolent 
and cultural associations that had largely taken the place of the royal and aristocratic 
institutions of Europe.  Today, instead, the civil society Tocqueville described is itself at 
risk.  Today it is the disconnectedness described in Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone that 
captures something of the spirit of our time. 
When Francis Lieber, a German immigrant who became Tocqueville’s life-long 
friend and correspondent, wrote his treatises on political ethics, legal and political 
interpretation, civil liberty and self-government, he observed the vigor of a society that 
embodied Edmund Burke’s idea of little platoons.  In a lecture he gave in 1849, Lieber 
contrasted the Anglican liberty of the English common law tradition with what he called 
the Gallican liberty associated with France’s highly centralized bureaucracy, which grew 
into what he called democratic despotism and Rousseauism [Tocqueville called it 
democratic absolutism] under Napoleon III during the decade that followed.   
Such concepts as Johannes Althusius’s intermural concept of symbiotic 
federalism (c 1600), Abraham Kuyper’s sphere sovereignty (c. 1900), and the Catholic 
doctrine of subsidiarity express a similar appreciation of diversity and pluralism.  For the 
most part, the nation-states of Europe and America were cultural mosaics rather than 
melting pots.  The NGOs of Tocqueville’s and Lieber’s day, just as in our own, were 
capable of doing much good as well as much mischief, but they effectively kept each 
other in check. 
What Lieber cherished about his new homeland, and so carefully detailed, is 
today at great risk.  Under the scrutiny of an ideological inquisition, many institutions are 
being hollowed out.  Some of the little platoons of my childhood – Boy Scouts, summer 
camp, PTA, and special school projects – may still be found but many are under siege.  
Yet it was not until I got to college in the mid-1960s that I first encountered systematic 
ideological axe-grinding in the midst of a cultural revolution that was then raging on our 
campuses.  The philosopher Sidney Hook, who dedicated one of his books at the time 
to my mentor, Edward Rozek, called the revolution one of “totalitarian liberalism.”  After 
three centuries, the prevailing liberal philosophy of the West had begun emptying itself 
of its particular foundational character in favor of the anonymous, humanitarian 
universalism of the provider state. 
In Democracy Without Nations? (ISI Books, 2007), Pierre Manent has analyzed 
what this emergent “democracy” entails.  “A state whose mission consists in 
guaranteeing rights . . . is being progressively substituted for the previous 
arrangements, which aimed at articulating and connecting the various parts of an 
independent people and their representatives” (p. 37).  As a result, “the state is less and 
less sovereign, and government is less and less representative.  The political 
institutions of the West are more and more functional-bureaucratic and less and less 
political.  Our political contrivances are more and more artificial, and each day they 
recede further from the natural movements of citizens’ souls” (p. 33).  He adds: “One 
can detect a fear that we are no longer a people, or at least less and less one.  This is 
true whether one understands the fine word ‘people’ in the sense of a coherent ‘society’ 
or in a ‘national’ sense.  Both the ‘societal’ and the national articulations of the people 
have been lost or are on their way to being lost” (p. 37).  To illustrate: the topic for 
debate at the Philadelphia Society meeting in 1994 was: “The USA: An Idea or a 
People?” 
Earlier generations of Americans, who were still engaged in building their 
common enterprise, took steps to “protect their brand.”  Justice Joseph Story, who was 
one of the major contributors to Lieber’s Encyclopaedia Americana, wrote a 
constitutional catechism nearly two centuries ago.  Along with Noah Webster’s 1828 
dictionary, it was part of a new nation’s education for liberty.  Lieber’s publications also 
helped shape the education of Americans from Abraham Lincoln to Theodore 
Roosevelt.  Literacy was valued at that time.  Americans were a people of the book.  But 
too many American schoolchildren today learn very little of a constructive character 
about American history, geography, and civics.  Revolutionary tracts pass for textbooks 
in many classrooms.  The change I have witnessed as a college professor just in this 
past generation has been dramatic. 
We need instead to preserve the institutions that built up the foundations of our 
civilization.  E pluribus unum is the national motto of America but it is equally true of the 
larger civilization.  A diversity of self-governing institutions answerable to the supreme 
law of the land was once recognized as a source of strength, not as a design flaw to be 
remedied.  Some things are too important to entrust to public officials and the 
mandarins of the administrative state.  James Madison, who helped design the federal 
Constitution, had an answer to institutional overreach: "The government of the United 
States is a definite government, confined to specified objects. It is not like state 
governments, whose powers are more general.  Charity is no part of the legislative duty 
of the government.”  Today, the American government is operating more under what 
Edward Corwin called a Constitution of Powers rather than the earlier Constitution of 
Rights.  Thus the improvident servant becomes an unprofitable master.  
But the problem is not public institutions and it is not NGOs, which may also be 
part of the solution.  It comes down to what one president called the “vision thing.”  The 
question is whether what Thomas Sowell called the “vision of the anointed” is good for 
us.  Does justice require that we reduce everything to “one size fits all,” as determined 
by international conventions and tribunals, the UN, and transnational legislation?  Or will 
people still be allowed a bit of elbow room so that they may be self-governing in the way 
the framers of the Constitution intended?  No system is perfect, of course, but why do 
today’s opinion leaders perpetually try to wipe the slate clean and start over?  Why did 
European leaders in the 1980s collaborate with Mikhail Gorbachev to create a “common 
European home,” as revealed by Vladimir Bukovsky and Pavel Stroilov?  For the last 
century the American Progressive movement and its successors have continually 
sought to move their reform plans to higher venues that are out of the reach of the 
public. 
Major NGOs tendentiously tear at the traditional fabric of American life in pursuit 
of this “vision of the anointed.”  In my library I have a book published back in the 1980s 
entitled The Coercive Utopians.  It is a good title.  The siren song of the social engineers 
has been around throughout our history.  An assessment by Katrin Flikshuh gave of 
Immanuel Kant’s philosophy is right to the point:  “for Kant the concept of right is 
inherently coercive, but we also saw that the authority to enforce coercive rights claims 
can only lie with an omnilateral public authority that settles the rights claim of all in 
accordance with the universal law of right.”  It is a “one size fits all” mindset that would 
collectively stamp us all with its signet ring.  Too many NGOs and too many idealists 
seek to use the coercive arm of government to reshape humanity in their own image.  
The now century-old Fabian Society stained-glass window has a picture of a globe on 
an anvil with Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw hammering away at it.  As the 
motto put it: “Remould It Nearer to the Heart’s Desire.” 
It is time to retire the Romantics’ infatuation with the myth of Prometheus in 
which the good guys have to steal something, like fire, from the gods, the 1%, or 
whoever happens to be the villain du jour.  This is the dust that our collective utopians 
throw into our eyes to keep us distracted.  The Philadelphia convention instead built on 
more than 150 years of common experience that had shaped the character of the 
American people, who proved to be exceptionally inventive in the area of self-
government.  Francis Lieber devoted a chapter to what he called “American liberty,” 
over and above “Anglican liberty,” in his treatise On Civil Liberty and Self-Government. 
The founders largely agreed with Thomas Jefferson: “In questions of power, let 
no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains 
of the Constitution.”  A century later, Charles Evans Hughes took a step away from this 
understanding by remarking: “the Constitution is what the judges say it is.”  Even later, 
Fred Vinson went further in Dennis v. United States (1951): “Nothing is more certain in 
modern society than the principle that there are no absolutes. . . .  To those who would 
paralyze our Government in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic 
straitjacket we must reply that all concepts are relative.”  In this fashion, we have 
gradually broken the very foundations of constitutionally-limited self-rule and substituted 
the entangling Lilliputian threads of global governance for a system of clearly articulated 
constitutional restraints that still left the citizenry free. 
